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Political connections and earnings quality: How do connected firms respond 
to changes in political stability and government effectiveness? 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates how the earnings quality of politically connected firms is affected by 
changes in political stability and government effectiveness in a developing country. We predict 
that increased government effectiveness reduces the benefits of political connections, requiring 
firms to be more responsive to market pressures and resulting in higher earnings quality. 
However, we propose that increased political stability enhances the certainty of benefits from 
political connections, reducing the need for firms to respond to market pressures and resulting in 
lower earnings quality. Using 2,073 firm-year observations for firms listed on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012, we find that the earnings quality of politically connected 
firms increases as government effectiveness improves, but decreases as the political environment 
becomes more stable. For policymakers, these results indicate that different dimensions of 
political and economic development can affect the incentives of firms with political connections 
in different ways. 
 
JEL codes:  H11, M49 







Prior studies indicate that firms can derive significant benefits from political connections, 
including preferential access to financing, preferential treatment in the award of government 
contracts and greater likelihood of government bailout during crises (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001; Backman, 2001; Blau et al., 2013; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; Faccio et al., 
2006; Goldman et al., 2011; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Karpoff et al., 1999; Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Yeh et al., 2013). In addition, Chaney et al. (2011) shows that political connections have 
an influence on the financial reporting quality of firms. For example, since firms can secure 
financing through their political connections, they have less of a need to respond to external 
market pressures, resulting in the disclosure of lower quality accounting information.  
 As the literature suggests the benefits of political connections are greatest in countries 
that are less developed and have higher levels of corruption (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, 2010; Chen et 
al., 2010; Boubraki et al., 2012), the obvious policy implication is that increased political and 
economic development should reduce the need for firms to rely on their political connections and 
increase the need for firms to respond to market pressures. This is the issue that we examine in 
this paper, as we investigate whether time series changes in the institutional environment in a 
developing country have an effect on financial reporting quality of politically connected firms. 
 We specifically examine changes in political stability and government effectiveness as 
we expect them to have different influences on the trade-off firms face between the benefits they 
receive from their political connections versus their need to respond to market pressures. We 
predict that as government effectiveness increases, the benefits firms derive from their political 
connections are eroded, forcing firms to be more responsive to market pressures and resulting in 
higher earnings quality. However, we also propose that increased political stability actually helps 
firms with political connections to be more certain of deriving benefits from their connections, 
reducing the need for firms to respond to market pressures and resulting in lower earnings 
quality. Thus, we predict that increases in political stability and government effectiveness will 
have opposing effects on the accounting quality of politically connected firms. 
 To investigate this issue, we use a sample of listed firms from Indonesia, a developing 
market with a strong history of political connections in business. Fisman (2001) finds that 
politically connected firms in Indonesia strongly rely on the benefits from their connections. 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that connected firms face financing difficulties when 
their political connections fall from power. Thus, Indonesia is an ideal setting to examine the 
effect of changes in political stability and government effectiveness on the earnings quality of 
politically connected firms. 
In our analysis, we use a sample of 2,073 firm-year observations of firms listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 and a two-stage least square regression model to 
address self-selection issues in the choice of firms to establish political connections. Our results 
indicate that the earnings quality of politically connected firms increases as government 
effectiveness improves, but decreases as the political environment becomes more stable. These 
results are consistent across our additional tests, which include firm random effects, a propensity 
score matched sample approach and an alternative measure of earnings management.   
 This study adds new evidence to the literature on political connections in emerging 
markets. Prior studies have examined how firms respond to changes in the strength of their 
political connections, e.g. when their political connections lose power through election losses 
(Fisman, 2001; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). In this paper, we examine how firms with 
political connections respond to changes in their institutional environment. We document that 
changes in political stability and government effectiveness have opposing effects on the 
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incentives of politically connected firms to respond to market pressures and improve the quality 
of their accounting information. Thus, our results inform policymakers that different dimensions 
of political and economic development may affect the incentives of firms with political 
connections in different ways.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables. Section 4 specifies the empirical 
models, and presents the main results and the results of sensitivity tests. Section 5 summarizes 
the paper and presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
Theoretical research on political connections indicates that firms can benefit from their 
connections by being better able to understand the public policy process, obtaining access to a 
direct channel to existing politicians, bureaucrats and decision makers that may result in 
influence over political decisions, and by politicians providing legitimacy by associating their 
reputation and status with the firm (Hillman, 2005). The documented advantages of political 
connections include preferential treatment in the award of government contracts, greater 
likelihood of government bailout during crises and preferential access to financing (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2001; Backman, 2001; Blau et al., 2013; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; 
Faccio et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2011; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Karpoff et al., 1999; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Yeh et al., 2013). 
 In the United States, Goldman et al. (2009) show that 31 percent of S&P500 firms have 
politically-connected directors on their boards and report a positive announcement effect when 
S&P500 firms announce the nomination of politically connected individuals to their boards. 
Cooper et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between political contributions and the future 
performance of U.S. firms. Kim et al. (2012) show that stock returns are higher for firms that are 
geographically closer to regions of higher political power in the United States. There is also 
evidence from other developed markets. Based on an exogenous shock to local government 
boundaries, Amore and Bennedsen (2013) find that local political connections are valuable to 
firms in Denmark. In Germany, Niessen and Ruenzi (2009) find that politically-connected firms 
have higher stock returns and accounting performance, but lower valuation ratios than 
unconnected firms.  
 The results of international studies also suggest that the benefits of political connections 
are generally higher in markets that are less developed and have higher levels of corruption. 
Faccio (2006) finds that politically connected firms are most prevalent and that political 
connections are only valuable in countries with higher levels of corruption. Faccio (2010) finds 
that differences in characteristics between firms with and without political connections are most 
pronounced in countries that are less developed. Chen et al. (2010) find that the effects of 
political connections are strongest in jurisdictions where corruption is highest. Boubraki et al. 
(2012) find that firms with political connections only enjoy a lower cost of capital in countries 
with higher levels of corruption, lower levels of democracy, less stock market liquidity and lower 
press freedom.  
  From an accounting standpoint, Chaney et al. (2011) examines the quality of accounting 
information in politically connected firms across 19 countries and finds that the quality of 
earnings reported by connected firms is significantly poorer than non-connected firms. They 
explain that this is because connected firms have less of a need to respond to market pressures to 
increase their quality of earnings information. In other words, connected firms can derive such 
benefits from their political connections that they are at no significant risk of punishment for 
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disclosing inferior quality accounting information to the public. For example, connected firms 
have preferential access to financing through their political connections, so they don’t need to 
respond to market pressures to disclose high quality accounting information in order to obtain 
external financing.  
 We propose that this trade-off between the benefits firms receive from their political 
connections and their need to respond to market forces is dynamic and varies over time. Some 
prior studies have documented another time-dimension to political connections. Fisman (2001) 
shows that firms experience negative returns as their political connections weaken. Mitchell and 
Joseph (2010) find that firms with political connections perform poorly when their government-
provided support is removed. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that firms connected to the 
former government in Indonesia had difficulty establishing connections with the new 
government after their connections lost political power.  
 Our contribution to the literature is that we examine how changes in the institutional 
environment over time affect the need for firms with political connections to respond to market 
pressures. In a more general setting, the international evidence provided by Leuz et al. (2003) 
indicates that earnings management is related to country-level factors, such as equity market 
development, investor rights and legal enforcement. Thus, a general assertion would be that as a 
country becomes more developed (e.g. strengthens its legal environment), the accounting quality 
of its firms should also improve. This is particularly the case for politically connected firms, as 
political and economic development is also expected to reduce the benefits of their political 
connections, meaning connected firms are subject to greater market pressures and will need to 
improve their earnings quality. However, in this paper we propose that not all aspects of 
development have the same effect on this relationship. 
 The first institutional environment indicator we examine is political stability. Political 
instability is associated with civil unrest, terrorism and the collapse of the government. Thus, it 
would be natural to assume that political stability is associated with beneficial outcomes, such as 
stronger economic development. However, in our particular setting we propose that political 
stability actually helps firms with political connections to be more certain of deriving benefits 
from their connections. If firms are more confident in the longevity of the government, they are 
likely to invest more in their political connections and expect to derive greater benefits from 
these connections. Thus, we predict that increased political stability enhances the certainty of 
benefits from political connections, reducing the need for firms to respond to market pressures 
and resulting in lower earnings quality.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The earnings quality of politically connected firms decreases as political 
stability increases.  
 
 The second institutional environment indicator we examine is government effectiveness. 
Government effectiveness refers to the quality of public services and the independence of 
government from political pressures. Thus, as government agencies become more effective, we 
expect the need for and the benefits of political connections are eroded. Since firms can no 
longer rely on their political connections to access the same level of benefits, such as preferential 
treatment in government contracts and preferential access to financing, they will need to be more 
responsive to market pressures. Therefore, we predict that increased government effectiveness 





Hypothesis 2: The earnings quality of politically connected firms increases as the 
effectiveness of government increases.  
 
3. Data and variable measurement 
3.1 Sample and data sources 
The initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) 
that are included in the OSIRIS and Indonesian Capital Market Data (ICMD) databases for the 
period 2003-2012. All financial data are from OSIRIS and auditor data is from ICMD. Country-
level variables are from the World Governance Index (WGI). We impose the following criteria 
for sample selection. First, due to the different nature of financial statements, we exclude all 
firms in financial industries (SIC 6). Second, we require no missing data for all variables used in 
this study. Finally, we drop all firms whose fiscal year does not end in December. After applying 
the above selection criteria, we obtain 2,073 firm-years as our main sample. 
 
3.2 Measurement of political connections 
We use Faccio (2006) data to measure political connections. She defines politically 
connected firms as “at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10% of 
voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) 
is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party.” Apart 
from its extensive country coverage, an important upside of this database is its considerable 
detail on the type of connection, i.e. connection with members of parliament, a minister or the 
head of state, and close relationship to a top official (Faccio, 2006, p. 369). 
 
3.3 Measurement of political stability and government effectiveness 
For country-level variables, we rely on the indices provided by The World Bank’s World 
Governance Index.  The first variable is political stability (PSTAB). This variable is defined as 
“perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, 
including terrorism.” The political stability index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
representing a more stable political situation. The second variable is government effectiveness 
(GOVEF) which is defined as “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies.” Similar to the first variable, the government efficiency index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values suggesting the government is more independent from political pressure. 
 
3.4 Measurement of earnings quality 
 We measure earnings quality using the level of earnings management of firms. We use 
two measures of earnings management. The first measure is based on the Jones Model (1991). 
The second measure of earnings management is based on the Modified Jones Model (1995). 
Since firms have the possibility to manage their level of earnings management upward or 
downward, we use the absolute value of discretionary accruals in all measures of earnings 
quality. Higher values of earnings management indicates that the firm has lower quality financial 
reporting. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons 
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For convenience, the definitions of all variables used in this study are presented in the 
Appendix. Table 1 presents the distribution of sample observations by year. Of the 2,073 firm-
year observations, 188 observations are from politically connected firms. This is equal to 9.1 
percent of the sample. 
 
Table 1 Sample distribution by year 
Year Connection No connection Total 
2003 18 142 160 
2004 18 143 161 
2005 19 161 180 
2006 19 174 193 
2007 20 172 192 
2008 21 189 210 
2009 20 188 208 
2010 18 207 225 
2011 18 246 264 
2012 17 263 280 
Total 188 1885 2073 
This table displays the distribution of politically and non-politically connected firms by year-end. The sample 
comprises firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the years 2003 to 2012. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean of both earnings quality variables are 
0.094. The average firm has total assets of $459 million, return on assets of 4.86 percent, 
leverage of 62 percent and growth of 4 percent. 42.8 percent of the firms have appointed Big 4 
auditors. The measure of political stability (PSTAB) ranges from -2.118 to -0.575 over the 
sample period, with a mean of -1.133. The measure of government effectiveness (GOVEF) 
ranges from -0.451 to -0.197, with a mean of -0.305.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
CONNECT 0.091 0 0 1 
AJM 0.094 0.129 0.000 2.806 
AMJM 0.094 0.129 0.000 2.748 
BIG4 0.428 0 0 1 
TOTAL ASSETS 459,168 1,067,498 1,063 11,558,796 
ROA 4.86 12.42 -43.45 52.25 
LEV 0.620 0.379 0.045 2.878 
GROWTH 0.040 0.205 -0.411 1.225 
PSTAB -1.133 0.466 -2.118 -0.575 
GOVEF -0.305 0.078 -0.451 -0.197 
This table displays the descriptive statistics for all variables in this study. The sample comprises firms listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the years 2003 to 2012. 
 
Table 3 Panel A provides details of the earnings quality of politically connected and non-
connected firms over the sample period. The mean tests indicate that politically connected firms 
8 
 
have higher earnings management (lower earnings quality) in 2007, 2008 and 2012. However, in 
other years the differences are insignificant, with 2010 even showing that politically connected 
firms have lower earnings management (higher earnings quality) than non-connected firms. We 
propose that this variation over time is related to changes in political stability and government 
effectiveness in Indonesia.  
 
Table 3 Firm and country-level characteristics 
Panel A: Earnings quality, political stability and government effectiveness 
Year AJM AMJM PSTAB GOVEF 
 
Connection No connection t-test Connection No connection t-test 
    Mean Mean 
 
Mean Mean      
2003 0.061 0.115 -0.88 0.066 0.114 -0.8 -2.12 -0.451 
2004 0.048 0.077 -1.45 0.050 0.077 -1.34 -1.87 -0.376 
2005 0.125 0.080 1.27 0.121 0.080 1.20 -1.48 -0.443 
2006 0.090 0.075 0.82 0.091 0.075 0.89 -1.40 -0.339 
2007 0.130 0.090 1.85* 0.130 0.091 1.80* -1.20 -0.283 
2008 0.178 0.116 1.67* 0.175 0.116 1.58 -1.09 -0.239 
2009 0.083 0.099 -0.83 0.087 0.098 -0.56 -0.76 -0.277 
2010 0.044 0.088 -1.85* 0.043 0.089 -1.92** -0.85 -0.197 
2011 0.081 0.079 0.09 0.082 0.080 0.11 -0.77 -0.249 
2012 0.257 0.102 4.43*** 0.256 0.102 4.44*** -0.58 -0.291 
Panel B: Other firm characteristics 
 Variable Connection No connection mean median 
  N = 188 N = 1885 t-stats z-stats 
BIG 4 0.676 0.403 7.29*** 7.20*** 
SIZE 12.019 11.604 3.99*** 3.94*** 
ROA 2.985 4.951 -2.18** -0.97 
LEV 0.726 0.609 4.08*** 2.54*** 
GROWTH 0.034 0.041 -0.42 -1.46* 
This table displays firm characteristics of politically and non-politically connected firms. Panel A presents the 
results for earnings quality, political stability, and government effectiveness variables for each year. Panel B 
presents the results for control variables. The sample comprises firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
for the years 2003 to 2012. Results of means t-tests and Wilcoxon (Z-tests) are displayed. Significance at * 10 
percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
Table 3 Panel B presents the values of the control variables for politically connected and 
non-connected firms. Politically connected firms are larger, have higher leverage, lower growth, 
lower return on assets and are more likely to appoint Big 4 auditors than non-connected firms.  
 
4.2 Main analysis 
In this section, we undertake empirical analysis of the association between political 
connections, political stability, government effectiveness and earnings management. However, 
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since firms can choose to be politically connected, there is potential for selection bias in our 
model. Therefore, we use the Heckman two-stage approach to alleviate this concern. 
 
4.2.1 First-stage regression: Determinants of politically connected firms 
In the first-stage regression, we estimate the likelihood of political connections based on 
the following probit regression: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝛽5 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀                           (1) 
 
where CONNECT is a dummy variable indicating the existence of political connections. The 
vector Xit denotes a set of control variables from the second-stage regression. The vector Zit 
denotes additional selection model variables that are determinants of political connections but 
have no association with earnings management. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) argue that firms 
from different industries have different incentives to establish political connections. Therefore, 
we follow Kim et al. (2015) and use the Industry % of connected firms (PROBMC) as our 
exclusion restriction variable (Lennox et al., 2012).  
Table 4 reports the results of Equation (1). We find that firm size is one important 
determinant in establishing political connections in Indonesia. Connected firms also have higher 
firm leverage (Cooper et al., 2010). We also find that politically connected firms in Indonesia 
have lower performance and are more likely to appoint Big-4 auditors. More importantly, the 
positive coefficient on PROBPC indicates that politically connected firms are clustered in certain 
industries. These findings are consistent with prior research (Kim et al., 2015; Chaney et al., 
2011). Then we use this equation to construct the inverse Mills ratio for the second-stage 
regression. 
 
Table 4 First-stage probit model: Determinants of political connections 
Variable Pred. CONNECT 
  sign   
SIZE + 0.012*** 
  
(2.88) 
ROA - -0.001** 
  
(-2.31) 
LEV + 0.054*** 
  
(3.05) 
BIG 4 + 0.090*** 
  
(6.40) 
GROWTH ? 0.017 
  
(0.52) 
PSTAB ? 0.029 
  
(0.59) 





PROBPC + 1.082*** 
  
(2.64) 












N   2073 
First-stage probit regression models relate political connections to firm-specific control variables and the exclusion 
variable (PROBPC). The dependent variable is CONNECT. The sample comprises IDX-listed firms from 2003 to 
2012. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at * 10 percent, ** 
5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
4.2.2 Second-stage regression: Earnings quality, political connections and political stability 
 To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following regression, which links earnings quality 
to political connections (CONNECT), political stability (PSTAB), their interaction term 
(CONNECT*PSTAB), control variables, and industry and year fixed effects: 
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝛽8 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀                                                   (2) 
 
where EARNQUAL is one of the measures of earnings quality: absolute value of Jones Model 
(AJM) and absolute value of Modified Jones Model (AMJM). We include a set of control 
variables which are known from prior literature to affect earnings management (Chaney et al., 
2011; Doidge et al., 2007; Fan and Wong, 2002). We expect that leverage (LEV) and firm growth 
(GROWTH) are positively related to earnings management. With respect to firm size (SIZE) and 
return on assets (ROA), we expect to find that larger firms and firms with higher ROA have lower 
earnings management. We also expect that firms appointing Big 4 auditors are more likely to 
have lower earnings management, suggesting that Big 4 auditors are able to detect or mitigate 
firms’ earnings management. We also include the inverse Mills ratio to control for the selection-
bias choice of political connections. 
 
Table 5 Second-stage regression: Earnings quality, political connections and political 
stability 
Variable Pred. AJM AMJM 
  sign (1) (2) 
CONNECT*PSTAB + 0.043** 0.042** 
  
(2.12) (2.06) 
CONNECT ? 0.065** 0.064** 
  
(2.46) (2.43) 
PSTAB ? 0.019*** 0.020*** 
  
(2.74) (2.78) 





SIZE - -0.005** -0.005** 
  
(-1.97) (-2.06) 
ROA - -0.000 -0.000 
  
(-1.39) (-1.49) 
LEV + 0.066*** 0.063*** 
  
(5.89) (5.67) 
GROWTH + 0.059*** 0.059*** 
  
(4.22) (4.18) 
MILLS ? 0.117 0.113 
  
(0.48) (0.47) 












N   2073 2073 
Second-stage regression models relate earnings quality to political connections, political stability and firm-specific 
control variables. The dependent variable is EARNQUAL, which is AJM or AMJM. The sample comprises IDX-
listed firms from 2003 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. z-statistics are in parentheses. 
Significance at * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions of earnings quality on political connections 
and political stability. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term between political 
connections and political stability (CONNECT*PSTAB). In Specification (1), the coefficient of 
CONNECT*PSTAB is 0.043, significant at the 5 percent level (t = 2.12). The findings in 
Specification (2) also provide similar results. This indicates that as political stability increases, 
politically connected firms in Indonesia engage in higher levels of earnings management. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 and suggests that as political stability increases, firms with political 
connections are more confident in deriving benefits through their political connections, reducing 
their need to respond to market pressures and resulting in higher earnings management (lower 
earnings quality). 
The results of the other variables in Table 5 indicate that firms with political connections 
generally have higher earnings management than non-connected firms (CONNECT), earnings 
management for non-connected firms also increases as political stability increases (PSTAB) but 
not as much as firms with political connections, and earnings management is positively related to 
firm leverage (LEV) and firm growth (GROWTH), and negatively related to firm size (SIZE).  
 
4.2.3 Second-stage regression: Earnings quality, political connections and government efficiency 
To examine hypothesis 2, we estimate the following regression, which relates earnings 
management, to political connections (CONNECT), government effectiveness (GOVEF), and 
their interaction term (CONNECT*GOVEF), while controlling for political stability (PSTAB), the 




𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝛽9𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+ 𝜀                                                                                                                                        (3) 
 
Table 6 Second-stage regression: Earnings quality, political connections and government 
effectiveness 
Variable Pred. AJM AMJM 
  sign (1) (2) 




CONNECT*PSTAB + 0.104*** 0.103*** 
  
(3.04) (3.02) 
CONNECT ? 0.000 -0.001 
  
(0.01) (-0.03) 
PSTAB ? 0.017 0.016 
  
(1.62) (1.55) 




BIG 4 - 0.002 0.002 
  
(0.13) (0.16) 
SIZE - -0.005** -0.005** 
  
(-1.98) (-2.05) 
ROA - -0.000 -0.000 
  
(-1.36) (-1.47) 
LEV + 0.066*** 0.063*** 
  
(5.82) (5.61) 




MILLS ? 0.100 0.103 
  
(0.41) (0.42) 












N   2073 2073 
Second-stage regression models relate earnings quality to political connections, government effectiveness, political 
stability and firm-specific control variables. The dependent variable is EARNQUAL, which is AJM or AMJM. The 
sample comprises IDX-listed firms from 2003 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. z-statistics are 
in parentheses. Significance at * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions of earnings quality on political connections 
and government effectiveness. The main variable of interest is the interaction term between 
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political connections and government effectiveness (CONNECT*GOVEF). In Specification (1), 
the coefficient of CONNECT*GOVEF is -0.443, significant at the 5 percent level (t = 2.21). This 
indicates that as the effectiveness of government improves, politically connected firms in 
Indonesia engage in lower levels of earnings management. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 
and shows that as government effectiveness increases, the benefits firms can derive from 
political connections are reduced, forcing firms to respond to market pressures and resulting in 
less earnings management (higher earnings quality). The findings in Specification (2) also 
provide similar results which suggest that this finding is robust to an alternative measure of 
earnings management. 
The positive coefficient on CONNECT*PSTAB in Table 6 also confirms the result for 
Hypothesis 1 and indicates that there are two concurrent forces influencing the earnings 
management of firms with political connections. Improved government effectiveness reduces 
earnings management, while increased political stability decreases earnings management. The 
results of the control variables continue to show that earnings management is positively related 
to firm leverage (LEV) and firm growth (GROWTH), and negatively related to firm size (SIZE).  
 
4.3 Additional tests 
In our main analysis we use a two-stage Heckman model to address selection bias or the 
possibility that firms with political connections are fundamentally different to firms without 
political connections. In this section we address other endogeneity issues, such as omitted 
variable bias, as follows. While unlikely, it is possible that unobserved variables are the source of 
the association between earnings management, political connections, political stability and 
government effectiveness. A firm fixed effects model is a good method to deal with this issue. 
Firm-fixed effect analysis is appropriate to control for the effects of unobservable firm effects for 
balanced panel data. However, in this study, due to the limitation of data availability, the nature 
of our sample is unbalanced panel data. Therefore, we use firm random effects (rather than firm 
fixed effects) as additional analysis in this study because this method is appropriate to test 
unbalanced panel data (Gardner, 1998).  
In addition, we follow prior research to construct a matched sample using a Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) approach (e.g. Kim and Shi, 2012; Kim et al., 2013). Using this 
approach, we create a control sample based on the political connections variable. For each 
politically connected firm we calculate a propensity score based on industry and firm growth as 
the matching parameters. This process results in 164 observations from the control sample 
matched with 181 observations from the treated sample. Using this sample, we re-examine the 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 7 Earnings quality, political connections and political stability (additional tests) 
Variable Pred. Firm random effects Matched sample 
  sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONNECT*PSTAB + 0.045** 0.044** 0.098** 0.096** 
  
(2.26) (2.21) (2.10) (2.09) 
CONNECT ? 0.068** 0.066** 0.131** 0.130** 
  
(2.56) (2.49) (2.10) (2.12) 
PSTAB ? 0.016* 0.016* -0.01 -0.012 
  
(1.85) (1.81) (-0.24) (-0.30) 




(-0.49) (-0.46) (-0.77) (-0.83) 
SIZE - -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 
  
(-3.05) (-2.86) (0.03) (0.01) 
ROA - 0 -0.000* -0.002 -0.002 
  
(-1.57) (-1.81) (-1.41) (-1.41) 
LEV + 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
  
(7.22) (6.23) (4.36) (4.36) 
GROWTH + 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.005 0.002 
  
(5.48) (5.49) (0.09) (0.03) 
INTERCEPT ? 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.068 0.068 
  
(4.56) (4.42) (0.51) (0.52) 
Industry dummies 
 
Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies 
 
Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 
   
0.119 0.122 
No. of control sample 
 
- - 164 164 
No. of treated sample 
 
- - 181 181 
N   2073 2073 345 345 
Additional tests relate earnings quality to political connections, political stability and firm-specific control variables 
for the main (N=2073) and matched sample (N=345). The dependent variable is EARNQUAL, which is AJM or 
AMJM. The sample comprises IDX-listed firms from 2003 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of additional testing of the relationships between earnings 
quality, political connections and political stability. Our main variable of interest is the 
interaction term between political connections and political stability (CONNNECT*PSTAB). In 
this table, we re-estimate Equation (2) using two alternative methods: Firm random effects and a 
Propensity score matching approach. Similar to our main model, we use two proxies of earnings 
management: absolute value of Jones Model (AJM) and absolute value of Modified Jones Model 
(AMJM). 
In the first and second specifications, we estimate Equation (2) using firm random 
effects. Similar to the results in the main findings, the coefficients of CONNECT*PSTAB are 
positive and significant. In third and fourth specifications, we use a propensity score matching 
(PSM) approach. Consistent with our prior results, we find that the earnings management of 
connected firms increases as political stability increases. 
 
Table 8 Earnings quality, political connections and government effectiveness (additional 
tests) 
Variable Pred. Firm random effects Matched sample 
  sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONNECT*GOVEF - -0.482** -0.486** -0.268 -0.237 
  
(-2.45) (-2.51) (-0.58) (-0.52) 
CONNECT*PSTAB + 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.135* 0.129 
  
(3.32) (3.33) (1.70) (1.65) 
CONNECT ? -0.003 -0.005 0.092 0.095 
  
(-0.08) (-0.13) (0.99) (1.05) 
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PSTAB ? 0.067*** 0.063*** 0.161 0.157 
  
(3.20) (3.08) (1.48) (1.47) 
GOVEF ? -0.496*** -0.469*** -1.695** -1.677** 
  
(-3.05) (-2.92) (-1.98) (-1.99) 
BIG 4 - -0.004 -0.003 -0.021 -0.022 
  
(-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.75) (-0.82) 
SIZE - -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.001 0.000 
  
(-3.00) (-2.81) (0.06) (0.04) 
ROA - -0.000 -0.000* -0.002 -0.002 
  
(-1.60) (-1.84) (-1.40) (-1.41) 
LEV + 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
  
(7.19) (6.21) (4.35) (4.36) 
GROWTH + 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.004 0.001 
  
(5.47) (5.48) (0.08) (0.01) 
INTERCEPT ? 0.024 0.034 -0.340 -0.333 
  
(0.54) (0.74) (-1.59) (-1.58) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
R-squared 0.085 0.083 0.118 0.120 
No. of control sample - - 164 164 
No. of treated sample - - 181 181 
N   2073 2073 345 345 
Additional tests relate earnings quality to political connections, government effectiveness, political stability and 
firm-specific control variables for the main (N=2073) and matched sample (N=345). The dependent variable is 
EARNQUAL, which is AJM or AMJM. The sample comprises IDX-listed firms from 2003 to 2012. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm and year. z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 
percent. 
 
 Table 8 presents the results of the same additional tests relating earnings quality to 
political connections and government effectiveness. We re-estimate Equation (3) using two 
alternative methods: Firm random effects and a Propensity score matching approach. We also 
use two proxies of earnings management: absolute value of Jones Model (AJM) and absolute 
value of Modified Jones Model (AMJM). Consistent with the main findings, we find that using 
firm random effects, the earnings management of connected firms decreases as the effectiveness 
of government increases. In the matched sample, we also find results similar to the main findings 
(a negative association), but the results are insignificant. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The prior literature on political connections indicates that firms with connections have 
lower accounting quality, as the benefits they derive from their connections essentially shield 
them from the need to respond to market pressures and produce high quality accounting 
information (Chaney et al., 2011). Our contribution to the literature is that we examine how 
changes in the institutional environment over time affect the need for firms with political 
connections to respond to market pressures. A general assertion, based on prior studies, would be 
that as a country becomes more developed (i.e. strengthens its legal environment, reduces 
corruption, etc), the benefits of political connections would be expected to be reduced, causing 
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firms to be subject to greater market pressures and to improve their earnings quality. However, in 
this paper we document that not all aspects of development have the same effect on this 
relationship. 
We find that the earnings quality of politically connected firms increases as government 
effectiveness improves, but decreases as the political environment becomes more stable. Thus, 
we show that changes in political stability and government effectiveness have opposing effects 
on the incentives of politically connected firms to respond to market pressures and improve the 
quality of their accounting information. For policymakers, our results suggest that the focus of 
development should be on improving government effectiveness, as improvements in government 
effectiveness reduce the need for firms to rely on their political connections.  
Future studies should continue to examine the effects of changes in different aspects of 
development on the motivations of firms to improve their financial reporting quality. This could 
be done in a single market over time, as in this study, or in a cross-country setting. We hope that 
the results found in this study, using data from Indonesia, are useful to the development process 








Variable   Definition Data source 
CONNECT = 1 for a firm with one or more directors who have political connections 
based on Faccio (2006), otherwise 0; 
ICMD 
AJM = Absolute value of Jones Model (1991) without intercept; OSIRIS 
AMJM = Absolute value of Modified Jones Model without intercept; OSIRIS 
PSTAB = Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures 
perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-
motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate of governance 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)); 
WGI 
GOVEF = Government Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. Estimate of governance 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)); 
WGI 
BIG 4 = 1 if a firm appoints a Big 4 auditor, otherwise 0; ICMD 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; OSIRIS 
ROA = net income after preferred divided by average total assets for the year; OSIRIS 
LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; OSIRIS 
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